A state appeals court has rejected an appeal from a Ridgeway man who is currently serving 20 years in state prison for committing acts of violence against a female acquaintance and repeatedly raping her for several weeks in the spring of 2017.
Gerardo Quiros, 33, appealed his conviction for first degree rape and criminal sexual act in Orleans County Court, claiming that reversal of the judgement is required because County Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment on the grounds that it was rendered duplicitous by the grand jury testimony of the victim, claiming each count of an indictment may charge one offense only. He argued that where one count alleges the commission of a particular offense occurring repeatedly during a designated period of time, that count encompasses more than one offense and is duplicitous.
In April of 2017, Quiros committed acts of violence against a female acquaintance and locked her in the bathroom, smashing her cell phone when she attempted to call 9-1-1.
When law enforcement arrived on scene, Quiros took off resulting in an hours long manhunt and a shelter in place in the Town Of Ridgeway.
Quiros was eventually found in Niagara County a few days later and taken into custody.
In May of 2017, he was indicted in the incident after repeatedly raping the woman involved for several weeks in the months of March and April.
In September of 2018, he was convicted by a jury verdict in Orleans County Court of rape 1st degree (four counts), criminal sexual act 1st(three counts), criminal possession of a controlled substance 7th (two counts), assault 3rd, endangering the welfare of a child, criminal mischief 4th and unlawful possession of marijuana.
The victim testified during grand jury that there were as many as 10 acts of forced sexual intercourse and 30 acts of forced oral sex that occurred between the middle of March and the end of April.
The indictment, however, charged Quiros with 7 counts of rape 1st degree based upon forced sexual intercourse, each of which was alleged to have occurred during one of seven consecutive weeks during the period of March 15 to April 29, and 20 counts of criminal sexual act in the first degree based upon forced oral sex, each of which was alleged to have occurred during that same period.
Because the 10 alleged acts of forced sexual intercourse and
30 alleged acts of forced oral sex could not be “ ‘individually
related to specific counts in the indictment, ” we conclude that
those counts of the indictment were duplicitous according to Quiros’ Attorney Scott F. Riorden
The State appeals court conclude that the court properly denied
defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment. With respect to the
counts of criminal sexual act in the first degree, after defendant
made his motion, the prosecutor provided him with a supplemental bill
of particulars that identified a precise date for each of the first 10
counts of criminal sexual act in the first degree. We conclude that
dismissal of those counts is not required because the duplicity was
“cured by reference to a bill of particulars supplementing the
indictment” .
To the extent that defendant contends that reversal is required because the supplemental bill of particulars changed the People’s theory with respect to some of those counts, defendant failed to preserve his contention for our review and we decline to exercise our power to review that
contention as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice.
With respect to the counts of rape in the first degree, although
the duplicity of those counts was left unaddressed by the supplemental
bill of particulars, before trial, the prosecutor provided defendant
with a document styled as a “trial indictment,” which indicated that
the People intended to prove a specific instance with respect to each
of the counts on which defendant was ultimately convicted.
In addition, the People provided evidence of those specific
instances of forced sexual intercourse at trial by offering the
testimony of the victim. The victim’s testimony was
detailed, graphic, and corroborated by receipts, photographs, and
emails that allowed the victim to pinpoint the precise dates on which
each of those incidents of forced sexual intercourse occurred.
“Because defendant was convicted only of those counts of [rape in the
first degree] where pretrial notice of specific instances was given
and where those specific instances were proved at trial,” we
conclude that dismissal of those counts as duplicitous was not
required.